Blog
27.October 2000 - 00:00
Would the EEA-agreement be a suitable incubator for the new EU candidates?
The EU enlargement debate has clearly altered in tone in the past six months. One concrete signal of this change in discussion about enlargement is a thought presented by the chairman of the European Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee, Mr. Elmar Brok. According to his proposal, a European Economic Area (EEA) -type of agreement could be a useful solution for those candidate countries which are fulfilling the so-called Copenhagen criteria more slowly than previously agreed upon. In Brok's opinion, it is necessary to enable these countries to participate in the internal market even before they are full members.
The suggestion is worth considering. But the EEA must absolutely not replace the full membership and leave the candidates in an eternal waiting hall without an access to the inside. Yet it could work as a tool which, in a rewarding way, would encourage candidates in implementing the acquis. In this case, the EEA would be a sort of incubator where the EU-embryos would mature into a full member – growing individually but nevertheless growing. The EEA should be seen as a stepping stone towards full membership. In other words, it would not be replacing full membership, but serve instrumentally, perhaps, to facilitate and expidite it.
Now we should discuss the instruments of access, and, if necessary, revise the existing Accession Partnership treaties so that they offer more evident rewards. A crisis of enlargement is to nobody's advantage.
Earlier this year, in discussion of the issue of EU enlargement organised by the Commission in Helsinki, I expressed this same idea about an EEA -type accession route. My focus was on the problems of environmental legislation. If full membership is granted according to a rapid schedule, this would most likely mean long transition periods in implementing the environmental acquis, which is a matter of concern to companies in Member States. Countries entering the union might be tempted to think that enough has been done once EU -membership is acquired.
On the other hand, a slow schedule would be a problem as well. Accession talks with 12 (and eventually more) countries in such a vast acquis is a hard mission even for the EU, and especially so if it is going to continue for many years, thus reducing the dynamics and flexibility of the Union globally, as well as threatening to frustrate the Candidate States.
The sensibility of the EEA-model arises out of this tension, because it rewards the candidate already at the application level. This would create a stronger commitment to implement EU -legislation than what the existing Accession Partnership treaties between the EU and the applicants do at present.
First of all, the EEA includes the first pillar issues. It gives the enterprises of applicant countries access to the internal market, and it gives their citizens the right to participate in exchange programs of youth and scientists, but it does not require the EU to extend its agricultural subsidy system to these countries. In this way the EEA would give a positive impulse to the candidates' economies, above all. On the one hand, these countries will need economic growth in order for their societies to meet the conditions required for final accession. On the other hand, it will mean a lot to the economy of the EU as well: growth in the internal market means increased exports and employment. In fact, it has been estimated that even 2/3 of the costs of enlargement (an estimate of 90 billion Euro, or appr. 3 % of EU's GNP, has been presented in discussions) could be covered by economic growth – and without doubt, even more in the EEA model. Even now that the Accession Partnerships are in place, the balance of trade between the EU and the applicant countries is clearly beneficial to the Union.
As to obligations, all of EU's environmental legislation is included in the acquis communautaire, which has to be entirely implemented by the EEA-country. Thus the ecological target will be achieved promptly, and any distortion of competition caused by environmentally damaging cheap means of production will be prevented in the candidate countries.
The markets of Eastern Central Europe have been said to be so open with the Accession Partnership treaties that Western businessmen can selfishly ask what they actually need the enlargement for. The answer is: for implementing the acquis. If the markets are opened – even in a limited way – without social and ecological regulation, nothing will protect the citizens of an Eastern Central European country against social and ecological dumping. In the end, we need protection against it for ourselves, too. The attractiveness of the EEA-model is based on the idea that efforts at implementation will be rewarded "on line"; benefits and obligations come hand-in-hand. The accession should take place step-by-step for it to be sensible – which is to say: the more conditions you meet, the closer you are to full membership. For instance, the administrative ability of monitoring and executing the acquis in practice is not very likely to develop unless the economy of the Candidate Country develops as well.
We must consider carefully the political signals we give: if there is no great difference in the EEA model compared to what the Accession Partnerships offer now, there is a significant difference in its sound. The enlargement is also be a pedagogical challenge to all stakeholders.
This model differs from the one recently proposed by the senior politicians Válery Giscard d'Estaing and Helmut Schmidt. They proposed that the NATO-countries Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic should enter the EU as full members, whereas the others would have to resort to the EEA-treaty and stay in a grey zone between the Union and Russia.
A rewarding EEA-model leading to full EU -membership would be fruitful for public opinion as well: seeing the positive results for national economy – including employment and welfare, even before actual accession – creates a foundation for the maximum legitimacy of the enlargement. This applies both to the citizens of Candidate Countries and current Member States.
Suomen Kuvalehti, 27.10.2000
The EU enlargement debate has clearly altered in tone in the past six months. One concrete signal of this change in discussion about enlargement is a thought presented by the chairman of the European Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee, Mr. Elmar Brok. According to his proposal, a European Economic Area (EEA) -type of agreement could be a useful solution for those candidate countries which are fulfilling the so-called Copenhagen criteria more slowly than previously agreed upon. In Brok's opinion, it is necessary to enable these countries to participate in the internal market even before they are full members.
The suggestion is worth considering. But the EEA must absolutely not replace the full membership and leave the candidates in an eternal waiting hall without an access to the inside. Yet it could work as a tool which, in a rewarding way, would encourage candidates in implementing the acquis. In this case, the EEA would be a sort of incubator where the EU-embryos would mature into a full member – growing individually but nevertheless growing. The EEA should be seen as a stepping stone towards full membership. In other words, it would not be replacing full membership, but serve instrumentally, perhaps, to facilitate and expidite it.
Now we should discuss the instruments of access, and, if necessary, revise the existing Accession Partnership treaties so that they offer more evident rewards. A crisis of enlargement is to nobody's advantage.
Earlier this year, in discussion of the issue of EU enlargement organised by the Commission in Helsinki, I expressed this same idea about an EEA -type accession route. My focus was on the problems of environmental legislation. If full membership is granted according to a rapid schedule, this would most likely mean long transition periods in implementing the environmental acquis, which is a matter of concern to companies in Member States. Countries entering the union might be tempted to think that enough has been done once EU -membership is acquired.
On the other hand, a slow schedule would be a problem as well. Accession talks with 12 (and eventually more) countries in such a vast acquis is a hard mission even for the EU, and especially so if it is going to continue for many years, thus reducing the dynamics and flexibility of the Union globally, as well as threatening to frustrate the Candidate States.
The sensibility of the EEA-model arises out of this tension, because it rewards the candidate already at the application level. This would create a stronger commitment to implement EU -legislation than what the existing Accession Partnership treaties between the EU and the applicants do at present.
First of all, the EEA includes the first pillar issues. It gives the enterprises of applicant countries access to the internal market, and it gives their citizens the right to participate in exchange programs of youth and scientists, but it does not require the EU to extend its agricultural subsidy system to these countries. In this way the EEA would give a positive impulse to the candidates' economies, above all. On the one hand, these countries will need economic growth in order for their societies to meet the conditions required for final accession. On the other hand, it will mean a lot to the economy of the EU as well: growth in the internal market means increased exports and employment. In fact, it has been estimated that even 2/3 of the costs of enlargement (an estimate of 90 billion Euro, or appr. 3 % of EU's GNP, has been presented in discussions) could be covered by economic growth – and without doubt, even more in the EEA model. Even now that the Accession Partnerships are in place, the balance of trade between the EU and the applicant countries is clearly beneficial to the Union.
As to obligations, all of EU's environmental legislation is included in the acquis communautaire, which has to be entirely implemented by the EEA-country. Thus the ecological target will be achieved promptly, and any distortion of competition caused by environmentally damaging cheap means of production will be prevented in the candidate countries.
The markets of Eastern Central Europe have been said to be so open with the Accession Partnership treaties that Western businessmen can selfishly ask what they actually need the enlargement for. The answer is: for implementing the acquis. If the markets are opened – even in a limited way – without social and ecological regulation, nothing will protect the citizens of an Eastern Central European country against social and ecological dumping. In the end, we need protection against it for ourselves, too. The attractiveness of the EEA-model is based on the idea that efforts at implementation will be rewarded "on line"; benefits and obligations come hand-in-hand. The accession should take place step-by-step for it to be sensible – which is to say: the more conditions you meet, the closer you are to full membership. For instance, the administrative ability of monitoring and executing the acquis in practice is not very likely to develop unless the economy of the Candidate Country develops as well.
We must consider carefully the political signals we give: if there is no great difference in the EEA model compared to what the Accession Partnerships offer now, there is a significant difference in its sound. The enlargement is also be a pedagogical challenge to all stakeholders.
This model differs from the one recently proposed by the senior politicians Válery Giscard d'Estaing and Helmut Schmidt. They proposed that the NATO-countries Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic should enter the EU as full members, whereas the others would have to resort to the EEA-treaty and stay in a grey zone between the Union and Russia.
A rewarding EEA-model leading to full EU -membership would be fruitful for public opinion as well: seeing the positive results for national economy – including employment and welfare, even before actual accession – creates a foundation for the maximum legitimacy of the enlargement. This applies both to the citizens of Candidate Countries and current Member States.
Suomen Kuvalehti, 27.10.2000